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“SO WE MUST GO BEHIND 
EVEN WHAT THE MICROSCOPE
CAN REVEAL”
The Hermaphrodite’s “Self” in Medical Discourse 
at the Start of the Twentieth Century 
Geertje Mak
On October 31, 1907, a Dr. König from Altona wrote to Franz Ludwig Von
Neugebauer, the most important international expert on hermaphroditism, to ask
his advice on a particular case.1 Emma R. had come to his hospital with heavy
pains in the right groin. She was twenty-five years old, had never menstruated, and
had never noticed anything abnormal about her sex except the incidental growth of
a small organ that excreted some fluid. For eighteen months she had been engaged
to be married. König’s medical investigation showed that Emma R. had a small
hypospadiac penis, that her right groin contained a testicle, and that her vagina
ended in a cul-de-sac. His overall impression was that Emma R. was feminine.
While talking to her, he writes, one does not doubt that one is dealing with a fem-
inine being. Moreover, he observes that her “whole thinking and feeling were fem-
inine.”
König summarizes his questions to Von Neugebauer as follows: “1. Would
you inform this person about her actual condition? 2. Would you deny her the right
to have intercourse with men? 3. Would you absolutely forbid marriage?”2 Von
Neugebauer answers these questions very briefly but remarkably:
In such cases, in which the person concerned shows definite female sex-
gender consciousness, the doctor acts more humanely if he does not inform
the person about the erreur de sexe that has taken place. To the herma-
phrodite, his own sex-gender consciousness should be normative and more
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important than the anatomical character of his gonads. Also, according to
old Prussian law, an adult hermaphrodite should be free to choose to which
sex he wants to belong. This very observation by König proves the weak-
ness of the corresponding paragraphs in the new German civil law.3
Von Neugebauer’s answer completely contradicts his earlier work, even the work
published in the same volume. Only three years earlier he had been asked to com-
ment on a case in which the New York professor of gynecology J. Riddle Goffe had
performed surgery on his patient E. C. to remove a “penis” and to construct a
vagina. This patient had been raised as a girl, definitely felt that she was a woman,
and wished to get rid of her “growth.”4 Goffe was severely criticized by the editor
of the Interstate Medical Journal for performing such surgery on the basis of the
patient’s wish without being certain of the patient’s sex.5 In the ensuing debate,
Von Neugebauer fully endorsed the standpoint of the critics: “I would certainly
refuse an operation if I should be able to ascertain the presence of testicles, and
would in case of doubt insist upon an explorative operation to ascertain the true
nature of the sex before I would amputate a supposed-to-be clitoris—which, how-
ever, may be a penis.”6
This comment is much more representative of Von Neugebauer’s general
point of view—at least before he replied to König. Until that time Von Neuge-
bauer had so adamantly maintained that the gonads were the only true criterion for
establishing a person’s sex that he had promoted the new technology of laparotomy
to gain certainty about the character of the gonadal structure of a living pseudo-
hermaphrodite. How can we explain his shift of opinion in his short answer to
König, in the final, supplemental pages of his life’s work on hermaphroditism?
It is not just a remarkable shift in the opinion of one doctor. Von Neuge-
bauer was a central figure in the international discussion on hermaphroditism at
the turn of the twentieth century. He had collected more than a thousand cases of
hermaphroditism spanning at least five centuries all over Europe and America and
had published on the subject in Polish, Russian, German, French, and English.
Therefore his change of heart might indicate an international shift toward a med-
ical discourse that had started to take the sex-gender consciousness of a her-
maphrodite more seriously with respect to the problem of sex assignment.7
In 1916 Von Neugebauer, who at one time could hardly suppress his frus-
trated anger when he had discovered that he could not force someone to change
her sex after he had concluded that she was male, was content to leave the difficult
questions to legislators.8 Stating that the law was incomplete, he summed up the
key questions without arguing for a particular resolution: Can the state force
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someone who ejaculates sperm but has been raised a woman and psychosexually
experiences herself as a woman to change her sex? What should be done when a
married woman is discovered, during an abdominal operation, to have testicles
inside if she and her husband do not want a divorce? Does the state have the
right—or is it obliged—to nullify that marriage?9 No longer as vocal in his advo-
cacy of the importance of sex-gender consciousness as he had been in his letter to
König, Von Neugebauer had certainly changed his mind about the gonadal foun-
dation of a person’s sex.
An international debate began to develop around this subject in 1902,
when the Dutch gynecologist A. Geijl, in a provocative article, proudly defended
surgery performed on a male hermaphrodite.10 This person had been raised a
woman and wished to marry. Concluding that she was actually male, Geijl had
only advised her that she would never have children, then had removed the penis
and enlarged the vagina. Geijl attacked Von Neugebauer and other doctors for
being inhumane when imposing a sex on a person against his or her will. He
ridiculed their fear that “same-sex marriages,” resulting from not telling the
patients the “truth” about their sex, would morally undermine society. He explic-
itly rejected gonadal tissue as the only signifier of “true sex”: “To determine the
sex of a hermaphrodite and our practical treatment of its bearer, the constitution of
the gonads is of lesser value than the condition of the organs of copulation and the
nature of the inner life and soul of the person concerned.”11 Von Neugebauer furi-
ously mentioned the accusation in the introduction to his life’s work: “Lately there
have burst out violent controversies about this issue, and I personally had to sub-
mit to a very sharp attack from Dr. Geijl in Holland, who accused me of having
unlawfully advised a girl, whom I had established to be an unacknowledged mas-
culine hermaphrodite, to change her civil sex from female to male.”12 In 1904, the
same year as the Goffe case in New York, Von Neugebauer and the German physi-
cian Theodor Landau publicly disagreed on the same subject.13 The discussion in
France was triggered by a case history related by M. R. Blondel, who in 1899 had
offered a happily married woman an operation to make conjugal life possible for
her after he had concluded that she had testicles. For this he was severely criti-
cized by Xavier Delore, a French doctor.14
In this article I focus on the intense discussion provoked by Goffe’s opera-
tion on E. C. “at the patient’s request” to investigate in more detail how the her-
maphrodite’s self appeared in medical discourses on sex assignment at the turn of
the twentieth century.15 A close reading of this discussion shows the crucial trans-
formation from a debate about the limited and contested authority of hermaphro-
dites in choosing their own sex to the weight that doctors were willing to give the
“self of the hermaphrodite” in their decision about a patient’s sex. In other words,
my analysis of this discussion shows how the hermaphrodite’s self started to
become an object of medical investigation, the basis of a field in which medicine
began to claim professional competence.
The Age of Gonads and the Best-Sex Paradigm
According to Alice Domurat Dreger, during the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury most physicians agreed that the true sex of any hermaphrodite had to be
defined by the structure of his or her gonadal tissue. The idea was based on
Theodor Albrecht Edwin Klebs’s classification system for hermaphroditism, which
was first presented in 1876. Dreger therefore labels this period “the age of
gonads.”16 In a popularized article she characterizes this period—not without dra-
matic rhetoric—as follows:
American and European medical men rallied around the idea that the
anatomical nature of the gonads (as ovarian or testicular) alone should
determine a subject’s “true sex,” no matter how confusing or mixed her or
his other parts. Henceforth, no matter how manly a patient looked, even if
he had a full-size penis, no vagina, a full beard, and a reputation for bed-
ding down (and satisfying) young maidens, if he had ovaries, he would be
labelled a female—in this case a “female pseudohermaphrodite.” No mat-
ter how womanly a patient looked, no matter if she had a vagina, fine and
rounded breasts, a smooth face, and a husband she loved, if she had testes,
she would be labelled a male—in this case a “male pseudohermaphro-
dite.”17
In her well-informed historical study Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of
Sex, Dreger describes the period in more nuanced ways. There she suggests that
medical practice was not rigidly based on gonadal tissue. Not everyone was
socially categorized according to the sex of their gonads. In cases of erreur de sexe
in which patients did not want to change their sex and even wanted to marry in line
with the sex they had been raised as, French doctors labeled them morally degen-
erated (“sexually inverted”). In such cases, British doctors were more inclined to
“desex” such patients, that is, to remove the (often atrophied) gonads.18 Both Eng-
lish and French doctors sometimes let cases of “mistaken sex” go or told their
patients that they could try to alter their genitals to match their social sexual sta-
tus better. Outward appearance and other sex traits occasionally determined the
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ultimate sex (157–58). At one point Dreger casually says that “hermaphrodites
often possessed two different identities, one personally and socially, another med-
ically and scientifically” (115), but this remark hardly alters her argument that an
overpowering medical science defined people’s sexes on the basis of their gonads
and demanded that their “gender” and “sexuality” be in accordance with these.
Thus until 1915, according to Dreger, “apparently no medical men dared
to openly question the gonadal definition of true sex” (163). In 1915, Dreger
maintains, Blair Bell was the first to ask publicly “whether we are justified . . . in
branding [patients] with a sex which is often foreign not only to their appearance
but also to their instincts and social happiness” (163). Moreover, new medical
findings, like ovotestis and other organs of internal secretion that functioned in the
development of specific sex characteristics, offered Bell the opportunity to discuss
the principle of gonadal sex assignment (165).
However, my analysis of French, German, Dutch, and English case histo-
ries of hermaphroditism in the nineteenth century shows that medical opinions
and concepts of sex in practice were troubled long before then. The heated inter-
national debate on the occasion of sex surgery and the shift in Von Neugebauer’s
thinking are only part of the evidence. Other evidence is more related to changing
diagnostic practices.19 Here I concentrate on the debate concerning sex surgery,
which marked the beginning of a change in how physical sex and sex-gender con-
sciousness were weighted in cases of doubtful sex fifteen years before Bell raised
the problem.
Bernice L. Hausman locates the start of a growing attention to what was
later labeled “core gender identity” in cases of pseudohermaphroditism in about
the same period as Dreger identifies, that is, the 1920s. In Changing Sex Haus-
man argues that this growth of interest in the “psychological” component of sex
came about when medical science could no longer assert that only the structure of
gonadal tissue defined the “true sex” of a hermaphrodite. Once other kinds of bio-
logical sex, such as hormonal sex and chromosomal sex, had been discovered,
medical science had to acknowledge that there was no single biological criterion
for “true sex.”20
Hausman notices an accompanying shift in conceptualization: from (pseudo)
hermaphroditism to intersexuality. The new term intersexuality better acknowl-
edged a “continuum of physiological and anatomical sex differences” and chal-
lenged “the idea of a ‘true sex’ hidden within the body’s tissues” (78). This devel-
opment made biological reasoning as the basis of sex assignment less convincing.
Increasingly engaged by the psychological aspect of the question, doctors began to
express hesitation and anxiety about decisions on sex assignment. However, it took
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almost two decades before the rise of psychological testing for masculinity and
femininity enabled a more “scientific” method of measuring sex roles, a method
that could compete with the earlier “hard” gonadal sex definition (79). It was only
in the 1950s that the term gender (gender role, gender identity) was coined by
John Money, Joan Hampson, and John Hampson in the context of protocols for
intersex management and the definition of transsexuality (94–109).21
Hausman stresses repeatedly that “gender” does not operate as an inde-
pendent factor in medical science and technology; rather, the development of
material technologies produced the modern conceptualization of gender. Therefore
she argues that once it had become impossible to designate a single predominant
factor by which to define biological sex, the gonadal definition of sex came under
attack and sex-gender identity became more important. Only from the mid-1950s
on, when medical “sex-change” technologies became so common that intersexuals
could be offered the opportunity to be turned into a verisimilar representative of a
particular sex, the gender identity paradigm began to dominate the field of inter-
sex case management (73). The standard of a “true sex” gave way to that of a
“best sex,” the latter also defined by the patient’s psychological makeup (79).
Although convincing, Hausman’s argument does not explain why the role of
sex-gender consciousness in hermaphrodites’ decisions on their sex assignment
became the subject of such a heated international debate in the first decade of the
twentieth century. Theoretically, the gonadal sex definition still held sway. What is
more, the developing technique of laparotomy had made it possible to acquire evi-
dence on the gonadal tissue of a living person (78).22 At the very time that the
gonadal conceptualization of sex was not only unthreatened but more practically
applicable than ever, doctors from various countries were publicly defending med-
ical treatments that helped hermaphrodites embody the sex in which they them-
selves wanted to live, even if it were other than their gonadal sex. This historical
circumstance cannot be accounted for by the above-described models for thinking
about the historical production of sex and gender in medical discourses; conse-
quently, it demands the revision of those models. I would like to begin by propos-
ing that the concept of “core gender identity” has a much longer and more com-
plicated history than Hausman suggests.
Between Dreger’s “age of gonads” and Hausman’s “best sex” paradigm, a
significant shift took place that has been obscured in large part by the difference
between their approaches. Despite Dreger’s extended description of the medical
practices that established someone’s sex and the confusions and contradictions
that resulted, her argument ultimately privileges medical opinions and definitions.
Hausman, conversely, concentrates on medical technicalities as preconditions for
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the development of concepts such as core gender identity. This more fundamental
focus on technicalities has the capacity to change radically the received view of
the “age of gonads.”
What is missing from both approaches, however, is the question of author-
ity and competence. To what extent were nineteenth-century physicians autho-
rized to assign someone’s sex? Could they force a person with an “erroneous” sex
to change it? Why were mid-twentieth-century physicians suddenly competent to
define someone’s “best sex”? I do not pretend to answer all these questions here,
but my analysis of the discussion of Goffe’s case history points precisely to this
issue. For it shows how a question of authority—the struggle between the physi-
cian’s and the patient’s voices—was transformed into a claim of competence to
interpret the patient’s voice. Recognizing this transformation seems essential to
our understanding of the jump from an age of gonads to a paradigm of best sex.
A Question of Authority
Case History as Narrative
Almost all extensively described medical case histories concerning hermaphro-
ditism offer a particular history within a larger medical-scientific framework.23
This narrative structure turns the story of the case itself into an object of exchange
between doctors. At the level of the case history, two structures can be found. First,
there is the structure in which the hermaphroditic patient (or sometimes his or her
relatives or lover) formulates a problem and seeks advice or asks for surgery or
some other treatment. At this level, the patient is a subject striving for something.
Second, there is the structure in which the doctor is confronted with a problem (a
question, a demand for advice, the need to perform surgery or administer some
other treatment) and tries to solve it as best he can. At this level, the doctor is the
subject structuring the story. The doctor’s perspective almost always dominates the
patient’s. However, it makes a considerable difference to what extent the doctor’s
and the patient’s goals are aligned.
By placing the case history within a larger framework of medical-scientific
theory on hermaphroditism, the story as a whole becomes a piece of evidence in a
medical discussion. Its meaning is no longer whether the patient was satisfied with
the treatment. It is interesting to see how the cases in this larger discourse are
labeled with the name of the doctor who circulates them: it is no longer, for exam-
ple, E. C.’s case history but Goffe’s. The significance of the case then depends on
either the singularity of the patient’s hermaphroditism (the doctor is proud of dis-
covering such a beautiful specimen) or the extent to which the doctor has been
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able to revise or augment the standard methods of investigation, interpretation, or
treatment.
Goffe starts his article with a brief summary of state-of-the-art medical
thinking on hermaphroditism at the time. He shows himself to be a true believer
and supporter of the gonadal, “true sex” theory: “The essential organ of genera-
tion, and that which must in the final analysis determine sex, is . . . the testicle in
a man and the ovary in a woman. A true hermaphrodite must possess both these
organs. Applying this crucial test by the most approved modern instruments and
methods, most of the cases have been conclusively thrown out of court.” After giv-
ing some examples, he admits that true hermaphroditism is sometimes found in
animals. “But let us hope,” he continues, “that man has reached such a stage of
development in his ascent from his lower forms that no example of such degener-
acy may ever be found.”24
Goffe does not believe that the case he describes concerns a truly her-
maphroditic specimen. Moreover, he soon shows his abhorrence of the idea of a
truly ambivalent sex. For him, the significance of this case lies elsewhere: “The
case of pseudohermaphroditism which I have to present is of special interest on
account of the operative procedure which I instituted and performed, and which
effectually eradicated all semblance of duality of sex and placed the young patient
safely in the ranks of womankind, where she desired to be” (757; italics added).
The accompanying illustrations underscore the success of the surgery, identified
by a caption as an “operation for removal of the penis and the utilization of the
skin covering it for the formation of a vaginal canal” (755; see 759 –62 for illus-
trations).
Goffe’s article became the subject of heated debate because of the seeming
nonchalance of the clause “where she desired to be.” This attitude is characteris-
tic of the entire article: the detail in which the operation is described expresses the
doctor’s pride at having found a new method of forming a vaginal canal, but the
part about the sex assignment and the decisive role he has given the patient is
commonsensical in a naive way—it lacks any reference at all to contemporary
medical discourse on the subject. Moreover, Goffe’s casual reference to his
patient’s wishes flagrantly contradicts his theoretical conviction, set forth in the
introduction to his article, that only gonads truly define sex. Thus there is a dis-
crepancy between the theoretical framework in which Goffe places his case and
the actual story he presents, a discrepancy that perfectly illustrates why my con-
clusions regarding sex assignment in that era differ so markedly from Dreger’s. Let
us therefore have a closer look at this story, in which the subjectivities of patient
and doctor interact.
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The Interaction of Voices
What is the relation between E. C.’s and the doctor’s voices in Goffe’s article, espe-
cially with regard to the problem to be solved? I do not have the transcriptions of
the interviews at my disposal, or a full account of the patient’s story in her own
words, but a careful analysis of the narrative nonetheless reveals a great deal about
the voices and the way that they are balanced in Goffe’s case description.
Goffe reports that E. C. was referred to him by her family physician. This
doctor briefly described her family background, education, and general medical
status. Then he came to the point:
She has never had any girl love affairs or been attracted passionately by
any girl, but has been attracted by boys; says that “that thing” (the clitoris)
developed to a noticeable degree and the hair began to develop on the
pubes, fourteen to fifteen years of age; played with it some at that time and
experienced pleasurable sensations therefrom; has erections at times and
at first feels that it is pleasant, but eventually [it] disappoints and annoys
her; wants to get rid of “the growth.” (757)
By passing E. C.’s case on to Goffe without further comment, the family doctor
seems at first glance to affirm her wishes. However, a closer look at his words
reveals their ambivalence. He does not seem to want to involve himself by provid-
ing his opinion on the legitimacy of his patient’s wish “to get rid of ‘the growth.’”
In other words, there is still room to interpret her wish as problematic. On the one
hand, her experiences seem to be affirmed because they are recounted here with-
out comment. On the other, they are made into an object of observation that can
also be questioned or criticized. This ambivalence is caused by the indirect way
that the patient is given a voice: no clear line is drawn between the doctor’s and
the patient’s voices.
At two points, however, the patient is literally quoted, namely, when she
refers to “that thing” and “the growth.” This indicates that she experiences the
flesh as alien to her, as abject, and strongly underscores her wish to get rid of it.
The first quotation, “ ‘that thing,’” is followed by an explanation, “(the clitoris).”
This is the only point at which the doctor takes a stand, by deciding whether to
call “that thing” a clitoris or a penis. Of course, the labeling is crucial in relation
to the larger question of whether contemporary medical ethics permitted removal
of the organ. In the end, however, the doctor again leaves the labeling to the
patient, thereby emphasizing her feelings of abjection.
After “quoting” the family doctor, Goffe provides his own general impres-
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sion.25 The patient becomes an object of observation: her attitude, her clothes, her
appearance—including the veil used to hide her facial hair—and her decisive
request for relief are described. Subsequently, Goffe lists several other character-
istics, suggesting a “logic” or a preexisting, widely used list of things to examine:
height, weight, gait, voice, head, arms, hands, neck, mammary glands, areolae,
abdomen, spine, lower extremities, pelvis, heart, lungs. Then he describes the
genitals in more detail (757–59).
The description of the patient’s physical appearance is clearly gendered.
All the physical secondary sexual characteristics are described as masculine:
facial hair, abundant hair on the extremities, “strictly male type” mammaries,
square chin, heavy jaw, neck “larger than normal for a female.” Only the voice is
described as ambivalently sexed: “feminine, with occasional male tendency.” Fur-
thermore, some nonphysical characteristics are gendered as female: “gait: femi-
nine in character,” “otherwise [i.e., apart from the hair] face is female type,” “she
showed feminine taste in dress, which was neat and in good style” (757–59).
There is nothing exceptional in Goffe’s describing these general character-
istics in explicitly and sometimes implicitly gendered terms. Almost all contempo-
rary descriptions of hermaphrodites had the same structure, insofar as they started
with a short life history and living conditions (in this case presented by the family
doctor), followed by general appearance, including outward physical characteris-
tics, and finally a detailed investigation of the genitals.26 It is remarkable, how-
ever, that during the “age of gonads” so much attention was paid to characteristics
seen as irrelevant to sex assignment.
Goffe’s description is remarkable in another sense. He hardly describes the
patient’s personality or character. The only comment along these lines describes
her as “somewhat shy and modest,” which can be interpreted as implicitly female
gendered. This is not exceptional for hermaphrodite case histories of that period,
but there were also many case histories in which much more attention was paid to
the question of whether someone’s personality was predominantly male or female.
In his description of the patient’s genitalia, Goffe notes the measurements
of penis and vagina, the place of the urogenital cleft, finer details of the genitals’
outer construction (“A narrow strip of mucous membrane ran along the free border
of the frenum as in cases of hypospadias”), and the result of bimanual internal
examination: “No internal generative organs could be outlined except a cord-like
extension from the upper end of the vagina.”27 Goffe does not explicitly conclude
that the “true sex” remains doubtful because he cannot find any trace of gonadal
tissue. He does not express any disappointment about this circumstance, nor does
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he discuss the options for sex assignment from a medical standpoint. Only in the
title of the article, “A Pseudohermaphrodite, in Which the Female Characteristics
Predominated,” does Goffe identify what he thinks the dominant sex is in this
case. It remains unclear, however, whether he thinks this on the basis of the phys-
ical examination or on the basis of other observations, for example, of the patient’s
personality. In the article, moreover, he calls “the growth” a clitoris, whereas in
the subtitle he refers to the operation as the “removal of the penis.” In short,
despite the body of knowledge and the diagnostic techniques available at the time,
Goffe’s account does not demonstrate a serious urge to discover the “true” gonadal
sex.
Without presenting a conclusion about E. C.’s sex on the basis of his med-
ical examination, Goffe continues his report as follows: “The patient insisted that
‘the growth’ was a great annoyance, that it made her different from other girls, and
she wanted it taken off. When asked if she preferred to be made like a man or
woman, [she] said decidedly, ‘a woman.’ Accordingly she was sent to the Polyclinic
Hospital, and the operation was done March 11, 1903, in the presence of the class
and some invited guests” (759). Suddenly the patient was no longer an object of
observation but the subject of a decision—namely, whether she wanted to be
made like a man or a woman. She was operated on “accordingly.” There is no indi-
cation at all that the doctor balanced the patient’s wish against the results of his
own medical investigation. Nor is there any evidence that he tried to justify her
wish by proving that her personality was definitely female. He barely took her
(male or female) character as an object of observation. In other words, the strong
subject position given to the patient here is not grounded in any medical or psy-
chological legitimation. Her right to decide appears to be self-evident. From this
point on the patient seems to define which goal has to be attained by medical
intervention.
Given his relative indifference to finding the “true” gonadal sex, Goffe
seems to have cared less about which sex E. C. chose and more about eradicating
sexual ambiguity. Finally, he defines the eradication of “all semblance of duality
of sex” as the goal of the operation. Thus, while paying lip service to the dominant
medical theory on “true” gonadal sex, Goffe proves much more concerned with
hiding visible sexual ambiguity through medical surgery.
Goffe next describes in detail how he created a larger vagina by making
two cuts along its length and covering them with the skin of the clitoris. As far as
I know, this was the first case in which the skin of a clitoris/penis was used to con-
struct a vagina. Goffe describes his discovery of this technique as accidental:
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The skin adjacent to the vulva was so harsh and bristled so with hair that
it was not available for filling in the lateral gaps in the mucous membrane
of the vagina. The only apparent resource was to allow them to fill up by
granulation, when suddenly the thought occurred to me, Why not use the
skin covering the clitoris? This was soft and delicate and free from hair. It
was therefore decided upon. (760)
While amputating the rest of the clitoris, he left the skin attached and subse-
quently used it to cover the wounds in the vagina. The success of the operation is
illustrated in part by photographs taken before and after it. Yet the article does not
end with the healing of the wound and the patient’s discharge from hospital. There
is a final note:
October 1, 1903. Patient reported at the office to-day. Has been in town all
summer taking treatment three times a week for removal of hair from her
lip and chin—electric depilation—which had been eminently successful.
External genitalia were covered with new growth of hair, and the general
glance presented perfectly normal appearance. The vagina took the usual
bivalve speculum easily and without pain. The vagina walls were smooth
and satisfactory in every way; the moisture of the vagina kept the skin-flaps
soft and, to the touch, indistinguishable from the mucous membrane.
Patient was in buoyant frame of mind over the success of the operation, and
left for her home the next day. (762–63; italics added)
It is interesting to see what defines the success of the operation here. Clearly, the
“perfectly normal appearance” is important (the goal having been to “eradicat[e]
all semblance of duality of sex”), as is the vagina’s ability to accommodate a nor-
mal speculum (and therefore presumably a penis) without pain, as well as its soft-
ness and the tactile indistinguishability between the mucous membrane and the
newly attached skin. Nevertheless, the final measure of success is the patient’s
“buoyant frame of mind.” Obviously, Goffe is proud of his success. By describing
his innovation and the operation in detail, providing photographs taken before and
after it, and summarizing the physical results, he makes himself the hero of the
story. Yet that story, even as he tells it, is framed by the patient’s demands and her
final valuation of the surgery.
That Goffe poses the question of whether E. C. “preferred to be made like
a man or woman” suggests that in either case he felt able to help her surgically.
This is interesting in light of Hausman’s belief that the idea of “gender identity”
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emerged only when doctors were technically able to make an intersexed person
look like one or the other sex.28 The choice that E. C. was given seems to have
been partly the result of a doctor’s presenting both sexes as medical options. The
very notion of gender, however, suggests an extensive psychological legitimization
of a person’s “inner sex.” Legitimizing a sex operation on the basis of gender does
not mean offering people the option of engineering themselves; as Hausman
rightly and critically remarks, it obscures that option (9). So it is not only offering
someone a viable choice between one or the other sex that produces gender. Some-
thing else must take place, too.
The Right to Decide
In an article titled “Shall a Pseudo-hermaphrodite Be Allowed to Decide to Which
Sex He or She Shall Belong?” Fred J. Taussig severely criticizes Goffe’s treatment
of E. C. Faulting Goffe’s superficial examination of her genitals, Taussig argues that
he did not try hard enough to find out her gonadal sex and then too easily accepted
her wish to be a woman.29 What interests me most, however, is how Taussig dis-
cusses the role of the patient herself in the decision. First, he dismisses the idea
that a patient can determine “our course in regard to these plastic operations”
(163; italics added). This is the main point of critique, for Taussig describes the
subject of Goffe’s article as “a case of a pseudo-hermaphroditism in which at the
patient’s request he [Goffe] performed a plastic operation” (162; italics added).
The phrase “our course,” which clearly addresses members of the medical profes-
sional, suggests that doctors should not be their patients’ tools. During the ensu-
ing debate in the Interstate Medical Journal, Taussig briefly summarizes his
standpoint on Goffe’s case: “While we will not deny the possibility that the indi-
vidual in this case may have guessed her true sex, the principle of allowing our
patients to decide such questions is bound to lead to serious consequences.”30
Taussig then refers to the Berendes-Landau case, in which years after a plastic
operation similar to the one Goffe performed the patient turned out to be a man.
Taussig does not, however, tell the reader how this person reacted to this discov-
ery.
In response, Goffe simply denies that he offered his patient a choice; he
only asked for her consent to perform the proposed operation.31 Taussig, obviously
unconvinced, says that he is glad that Goffe did not intend to let the patient decide
the sex question. However, he quotes the entire passage in which Goffe describes
how he asked her what she wanted and then acted “accordingly,” to show the
reader that his own interpretation of what happened is correct. Moreover, Taussig
claims that it is by no means “absurd” to think that Goffe was of the opinion that
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his patient had the choice, “since Prof. Landau, of Berlin, in a recent article on
this subject, argues that the patient ought to decide his or her own sex in these
cases.”32 Von Neugebauer, in his contribution to the discussion, writes that
Landau bases his theoretical arguments upon a paragraph of the old Prus-
sian law, which states that in all cases of doubtful sex the hermaphrodite,
who is of full age, has the right to decide for himself to which sex he wants
to belong. This paragraph would, then, for instance, permit a physician to
amputate (even in the presence of testicles) a hypospadiac penis in a male
who, by error, was raised as a girl, if this individual desired to continue his
life under the disguise of a female.33
Taussig suggests that Goffe legitimized “his course” after referring to Landau’s
article. Goffe, however, seems unaware of this international debate and simply
denies that he gave his patient a choice.
Sex Assignments, Law, and Medicine
It is interesting that the old Prussian law, which gave a person with a doubtful sex
the right to choose his or her sex as an adult, is referred to so often in this discus-
sion.34 Only at the start of the twentieth century was the law changed so as to leave
the decision entirely up to physicians. Outside Germany, the old law had disap-
peared earlier, mostly with the introduction of French civil and penal codes after
the Napoleonic Wars. Their references to the old law show that doctors like Lan-
dau and Goffe, the latter albeit less consciously, actually recognized an old right.
They cannot be considered “modern” in their insistence on the right of hermaph-
rodites to decide for themselves as long as their sex was medically undecided.
Dreger shows how the gonadal classification of hermaphroditism, intro-
duced in 1876 by Klebs, essentially precluded the possibility of “true hermaph-
roditism” from a medical point of view.35 Theoretically, the old right of hermaph-
rodites to decide became moot, because it was impossible for anybody to have a
true hermaphroditic sex. In practice, however, doctors often could not determine
the true gonadal sex or were divided in their opinions. In these cases, the old right
was brought to bear, often in a seemingly unconscious manner. In countries where
this right had ceased to exist and no other provisions had been made as to how to
proceed in cases of doubtful sex (as in France, England, and the Netherlands), the
outcome was the same as it had been: the decision was left to the hermaphrodite.
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that in cases in which doctors felt
reasonably certain about the gonadal sex, the patients could not be forced to live
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according to this sex or to change their civil sex accordingly. For the period
1890–1908, my collection of case histories contains fifty-two examples of female-
born persons found to be medically male during their lifetime. There is no evi-
dence that any of them was forced to change sex. Moreover, in six cases the physi-
cian involved agreed to perform an operation to help the patient look more female.
Since Dreger’s argument is restricted to medical-scientific opinions and
concepts, the significance of what happened in practice to these hermaphrodites
escapes her analysis. She does not discuss the legal context or the consequences
of the Klebsian classification for hermaphrodites’ legal status. In this way, she
implies that doctors had decided on the sex assignment of their patients, whereas
they had only held on to their opinion of the sex of their patients. In her discussion
of one female-born person found to have testicles, for instance, Dreger provides a
lengthy description of the surgeon François Guermonprez’s moral disapproval of
Louise-Julia-Anna’s sex life as a woman, but she pays little attention to this per-
son’s refusal of a sex change or to the extended footnote in which Guermonprez
explains that he could not force a change on her.36 To a much greater extent than
Dreger suggests, patients had the freedom to refuse a sex change. Physicians sim-
ply did not have the authority to force their patients to change sex.
Consider, for example, Von Neugebauer’s defense against Geijl’s question-
ing of his humanity: “In cases in which I establish the male character of a her-
maphrodite raised as a female, I suggest, (but do not by any means insist upon) a
change in the birth registers. These changes were only made on the special wish of
the individuals.”37 Describing the practices of other doctors, Von Neugebauer else-
where states: “As a rule, however, in the case of a hermaphrodite raised as a girl
the authorities allow him to continue in his mode of life, unless he himself desires
to change it.” Moreover, in several cases of married hermaphrodites, “the physi-
cian discovering the male sex of the wife, told neither her nor her husband about
the matter so as not to disturb the previous marital bliss of the couple.”38
On one occasion, Von Neugebauer was so upset about his inability to pre-
vent a father from allowing his daughter, who had testicles, to marry a man who
did not know it that he asked for the public prosecutor’s advice. To his deep indig-
nation, Von Neugebauer was told that “a change of civil sex can take place only
when the person in question wants such a change herself; she cannot be forced.”39
As the reference to Guermonprez’s footnote demonstrates, it was much the
same in France. While affirming that in France it was prohibited to wear the
clothes of the opposite sex except during carnival, Guermonprez argued that it was
not a surgeon’s task to execute police measures. He was not even able to contribute
to such measures, because he was sworn to professional secrecy: “In front of the
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surgeon, more than in front of anybody else, the subject has to be free to make the
decision he thinks appropriate while remaining certain of the surgeon’s discre-
tion.”40 Thus Dreger is right that some physicians expressed moral indignation
when somebody did not live and love according to his or her gonadal sex, but she
ignores the fact that doctors could not force patients to change their civil sex
according to medical judgment.41 The doctor’s power was restricted to the clinical
context.
This is where Hausman comes in. If we leave out the reference to endo-
crinology, her central statement about the 1950s also applies to the situation half
a century earlier: “As endocrinology and plastic surgery developed, doctors could
intervene at the level of anatomy and physiology to enable their patients to simu-
late one or the other sex. This ability presented an ethical problem to attending
physicians: if medical science had the power to enable an intersexual person to
become a male or female person, what factors should the physician take into
account in deciding which sex the subject should become?”42 Before 1900, that
is, sex assignment had been ultimately a legal matter, but once surgical solutions
to the problem of sexual ambiguity were available, the sex assignment decision
was increasingly made in surgeons’ consulting rooms. The resulting operations led
to heated discussions among physicians about the patient’s role in the decision
because the medicoethical questions attending those operations had never been
addressed before.
More advanced surgical skills also made possible a new objective. While
physicians could not always determine the gonadal “true sex” with certainty or
impose a “true sex” on their patients, the threat of an incongruity between the
gonadal “true sex” and the sex that a hermaphrodite represented in society 
continued to exist. But with the new medical techniques it was now possible at
least to avoid the disturbing effects of visible sexual ambiguity. There is ample
nineteenth-century evidence of hermaphrodites attempting to hide their sexual
ambiguity, but only after surgery had become less dangerous and painful were
doctors able to help them substantially in doing so. The needs of patients who
desperately wanted to keep the ambiguity of their sex secret and the requirements
of public decency and order were met. Some doctors, such as Goffe and Geijl,
started to redefine the problem of “sexual ambiguity” as the danger of it. They did
not demand congruency between gonadal “true sex” and sex assignment so much
as the erasure of the visible signs of sexual ambiguity, so that a hermaphrodite
clearly and exclusively represented one sex. Goffe was most concerned with the
erasure of ambiguity, and Geijl with bringing the hermaphrodite’s feelings and
experiences to the fore.
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The new objective of a single sex points toward what Julia Epstein
describes as a late-twentieth-century approach to hermaphroditism: “Today, sur-
gical and medical intervention renders invisible any individuals born with inter-
sexual characteristics. . . . Suppression achieves its perfect form in ‘excision,’ and
the potential of the monster-outsider for subversive social arrangements is eradi-
cated altogether.”43 E. C.’s case and the international debate discussed here reveal,
first, that this approach is not a recent one. More important, they demonstrate the
extent to which such interventions proceeded from the wishes of hermaphrodites
themselves. Of course, these wishes were part of the dominant discourse, but that
makes it difficult to refer to “suppression.” Suppression of what, exactly?
This is not to say that the situation in 1900 was altogether the same as in
the second half of the twentieth century. Apart from the significant technical devel-
opments during the intervening decades, there were some crucial differences. In
the 1950s the possibility and the nature of surgical intervention were decisions for
physicians, who possessed both the authority and the competence. In 1900, how-
ever, the question of authority and competence still had to be settled. Should a
doctor make the decision on the basis of professional knowledge and medical stan-
dards, thereby turning the patient into an object of investigation and treatment? Or
should the patient be granted the right to decide and then ask a surgeon to carry
out this decision?
It may seem obvious to the modern reader that the ultimate authority in
these cases rested with the physician, but some interpretive caution is required.
Only a century earlier it would have been self-evident that the patient defined the
objectives of a physician’s intervention.44 Although he denied it later, Goffe offered
his patient a choice in his consulting room, seemingly unaware of the possible
objections. Some years earlier another physician had made a similar decision “at
the patient’s request.” The English doctor G. R. Green reported a case in which he
had removed the testicles of a female-born hermaphrodite as she had asked. “The
question now arose, as to what should be done, as the patient in mind and habit is
more a woman tha[n] a man, and [as it] is illegal for him to remain as he is in
female attire, he expressed a desire to have the testicles removed and continue
[as] a woman and it seems to me, that is the best solution of the difficulty.”45
Apparently, if a surgical intervention was under consideration, surgeons
tended more or less to leave the decision up to the patient. That the decision
entailed not only consent for the operation (as Goffe would have it) but an actual
sex assignment with moral and legal implications did not always occur to them.
Thus Taussig’s warning that doctors should not be their patients’ tool was not just a
rhetorical one. Nor was he the only one eager to safeguard the physician’s author-
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ity: others also urgently reminded surgeons of their responsibilities with regard to
morality and justice.46 Evidently, it was still necessary to claim full and exclusive
medical authority over these decisions, and there is ample evidence that the ques-
tion was not settled immediately.47
Even more fundamental to our understanding of what happened around
1900 is the shift—quite prominent in the final part of the debate concerning 
E. C.’s operation—from discussing the hermaphrodite’s right to choose to claiming
the doctor’s competence over the hermaphrodite’s sex-gender consciousness. It is
precisely this shift that made the hermaphrodite’s self an object of medical investi-
gation and decisively removed the question of authority from sight.48 This crucial
transformation paved the way for the construction of gender in the 1950s as
described by Hausman.
Claiming Competence over Sex-Gender Consciousness
Psychological Sexuality as an Object
The debate described so far was about who had the power to decide, not about
why someone would choose one or the other sex. Hermaphrodites were not obliged
to legitimize their choices, nor were they required to prove that their identity was
more male or more female. Their reasons for choosing one or the other sex included,
for example, income prospects, the ability to urinate standing up, planned mar-
riages, education, and job training.
In the remaining part of the discussion of E. C.’s case, however, the
patient’s self is itself seen as an object of investigation. “Although he [Goffe]
describes the case as one in which the female characteristics predominated,”
Taussig writes, “he apparently wished to give the patient choice of her sex, for he
‘asked if she preferred to be made like a man or a woman,’ whereupon ‘she said
decidedly ‘a woman.’”49 The word although is interesting here. It suggests that if
Goffe had made his decision solely on the basis of his observation that “the female
characteristics predominated,” Taussig would not have been so upset. But Goffe
hardly undertook to determine if “the female characteristics predominated.” In his
own article he renders no conclusion about E. C.’s sex. Taussig, however, discusses
several grounds for reaching such a conclusion. Apart from critiquing Goffe’s phys-
ical examination, Taussig raises the possibility of a psychological argumentation.
All the characteristics described in E. C.’s case, Taussig maintains, includ-
ing the “psycho-sexual feelings,” “might appear in either sex.” For “Von Neuge-
bauer has shown how much the sexual feeling of an individual depends upon the
conditions under which such a one has been raised. That the patient in this case
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has the sexual desires of a woman must, therefore, be looked upon, more as a
result of education, of suggestion and imitation than as in any way conclusive evi-
dence of her true sex” (162–63). It is important to note that Taussig takes the
patient’s “sexual desires” as the marker of her psychic femininity. This indicates
how indistinguishable sexual preference and sex-gender identification were con-
sidered at that time.50 Again referring to the patient’s wishes, Taussig argues that
they
are almost entirely governed by the sexual feelings, and these in turn are
largely the result of external conditions, such as education and surround-
ings. Moreover, it not so infrequently happens that the sexual feelings of 
a hermaphrodite change from that of a man to woman or vice versa, once,
nay, even several times in the patient’s life. Besides being frequently at
variance with the actual sex of the individual, therefore, we here are deal-
ing with a very changeable quality. (163)
In his answer to Taussig, Goffe appears to have been more conscious of the grounds
on which he made the decision concerning E. C.’s sex assignment than he seemed
at first. After stating that it was impossible to do a diagnostic operation without
unsexing the patient,51 he claims an even deeper competence in establishing a
person’s sex: “So we must go behind even what the microscope can reveal; make a
study of the individual mental and emotional attributes from a physio-psychologi-
cal point of view.” Here he quotes from an article by William Lee Howard, “Sex
Perversion in America”:
“A thorough understanding of the recent investigations in the anomalies of
sex feeling, of sex perversion, and the fact that there is something more in
sex and sexuality than physical organs is absolutely necessary if we wish
to render justice to our fellow-men. . . . When, from the earliest recognition
of self, the sexual instincts have been those of one sex and the anatomic
organs are of the opposite sex we must, from a scientific standpoint, con-
sider the sex determined by the mental factors.”52
Although Howard was discussing not hermaphroditism but “sexual inversion,”
Goffe uses his argument to defend his conclusion concerning E. C.’s predominantly
female characteristics.
Again Taussig is unconvinced and bases his response mainly on Von
Neugebauer: “We have many instances recorded in which, long after puberty,
there was a change in the psychic sexuality of the individual. . . . the possibility of
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change in such a mental attribute or inclination must be acknowledged, but no
testicle was ever known to change into an ovary.” Arguing that sex is strongly con-
nected to the power of reproduction, which is in turn connected to ova and sperm
and to the gonads producing them, Taussig claims that these elements have to be
the determining factors, rather than “such a purely subjective element as sexual
feeling or the psychic sexuality.”53
Although Goffe never suggests in his initial article that he allowed E. C. to
choose because he believed her psychological sexuality more important than other
grounds for the decision on her sex, Taussig starts to argue against him as if he
did. Taussig’s presupposition is that the decision to give E. C. the right to choose
must have been based on Goffe’s observation of her “psychic sexuality.” Subse-
quently, he argues that in cases of hermaphroditism this psychological sex cannot
serve as a solid basis for decisions concerning sex assignment. Only after Taussig
starts this line of discussion does Goffe affirm that his decision was indeed based
on a psychological diagnosis of E. C.’s sex and attempt to defend himself by refer-
ring to another medical expert, Howard. Goffe even claims that psychological
knowledge is more crucial than “what the microscope can reveal.”
The debate has clearly moved from the issue of who, the patient or the doc-
tor, wields power to a discussion between doctors about the best grounds for deter-
mining a patient’s sex. Although the patient’s sexual self plays a role in this dis-
cussion, suddenly it is an object of observation (to assess whether it is stable, how
it is related to sexual desire, and so on). The hermaphroditic self is no longer a
subject.
Goffe’s article became the object of such severe criticism not because he
had let E. C.’s “psychological sex” prevail over her as yet unclear “gonadal sex”
but, I believe, because he granted her a subject position in which she could decide
for herself. Had Goffe tried to make her “psychological sex”—what Von Neuge-
bauer called her “sex-gender consciousness”—an object of investigation from the
start, and had he concluded that she was much more female in character and
therefore should be made into a female, he, the doctor, would still have been the
one in charge of the decision. Had Goffe claimed the competence to decide this
case, it would have been much less provocative to his colleagues.
Sex-Gender Self-Consciousness in 1900
In reality, Goffe’s article triggered a general discussion in the United States that
had been waiting to happen. In European countries, similar cases had provoked
the same debate during the same time period. Moreover, augmented diagnostic
skills (anesthesia, laparotomy and other surgical interventions) at the end of the
nineteenth century uncovered many more cases of doubtful sex in which, because
there were no outward signs of sexual ambiguity, it would have been impossible
otherwise for the patients themselves to suspect anything. These inadvertent dis-
coveries led to embarrassing situations in which many physicians simply chose to
keep silent about their findings, sometimes invoking the argument of someone’s
“sexed self” to justify themselves.54
The growing interest in hermaphroditic sex-gender consciousness in gen-
eral can be seen across time in the different categorizations of the more than
twelve hundred cases of hermaphroditism identified in the index to Von Neuge-
bauer’s study: “male pseudohermaphrodites who had been raised as girls and
spontaneously recognized their male sex,” “rejection of change of civil sex assign-
ment by pseudohermaphrodites, despite established erreur de sexe,” “sexual con-
sciousness and sexual drive,” “sexual consciousness discordant with the anatom-
ical character of the gonads,” and so on.55 If we look at the years in which the
publications about these cases appeared, we find the following:
The sixteen cases in which hermaphrodites refused to change their civil
sex assignment were published between 1882 and 1906. Of the thirty-three cases
of spontaneous recognition of “true sex,” twenty-seven were published between
1856 and 1905. The other six date from the early modern period, and five of them
had to do with physical developments (the growth of a penis, the descent of testi-
cles), often in combination with sexual relations with and even impregnation of
women. The cases registered by Von Neugebauer under the category “sexual con-
sciousness and sexual drive” almost all refer exclusively to sexual drive (no sex-
ual drive, changing sexual drive, or sexual drive in accordance with anatomical
sex). Sexual drive was noticed in cases of hermaphroditism of all centuries. Only
the category “sexual consciousness discordant with the anatomical character of
the gonads” contained cases in which sex-gender consciousness was the main
issue. These nineteen cases were published between 1850 and 1907.
These results suggest increasing interest in a patient’s sex consciousness
during the second half of the nineteenth century. The interest in sex-gender con-
sciousness, however, cannot be explained merely by the improvement in medical
skills for diagnosing a doubtful sex or for performing sex surgery.
Sexual Inversion
From around 1870 the concept of sex-gender consciousness slowly emerged from an
ongoing exchange among physicians and psychiatrists and their patients concerning
an annually increasing collection of cases of “sexual inversion.” Several historians
have described and analyzed this archive of cases and have noticed that it contains
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more than cases of what we would now call “homosexuality.”56 There are also cases
in which sexuality is a lesser issue than “sex-gender inversion” or “transvestism.”
What is more, it is difficult to differentiate between these two aspects in the case his-
tories—they are much more clearly distinguished today—because they seem to
refer to each other all the time: sexual desire for someone of the same sex was the
ultimate proof of sex-gender inversion, and sex-gender inversion indicated sexual
desire for people of the same sex.57 Therefore the diagnostic techniques developed,
the medical explanations advanced, and the case histories collected and categorized
referred in equal measure to (homo)sexual identity and sex-gender identity. Only
around 1910 did sexologists such as Magnus Hirschfeld and Havelock Ellis start to
make a clearer distinction between sexual preferences and gender identification.58
To conceive homosexuality as a “central feature of the inner self” is one
characteristic of the concept of the modern homosexual, as Harry Oosterhuis con-
vincingly argues in his innovative study on Richard von Krafft-Ebing.59 Similarly,
sex-gender consciousness was increasingly conceived of as deeply anchored in
one’s inner self, often closely linked to or merged with sexual preferences. The
diagnostic techniques, explanations, and categorizations that concerned sex-
gender consciousness and were developed in the field of sexual inversion started
to influence medical interests, observations, and treatments for hermaphrodites.
There is ample evidence that the two branches of medicine began to inter-
act theoretically around the beginning of the twentieth century. Dreger describes
how certain physicians started to label hermaphrodites who did not identify with
their gonadal sex and who sexually desired people with the same gonadal sex as
“homosexual hermaphrodites.”60 At the conclusion of his article in the Interstate
Medical Journal, Von Neugebauer indicates his growing interest in “the psychic
condition of hermaphrodites.” He then mentions the study of the “so-called psy-
chical hermaphrodisia with apparently normally formed genitalia” as a work for
the future, referring to the research of the sexologist and leader of the contempo-
rary German gay emancipation movement, Hirschfeld.61 In turn, Hirschfeld was
greatly interested in the possible physical cause of transvestism and homosexual-
ity and described cases in which he had found (or thought he had found) an erreur
de sexe. Hirschfeld’s cases were among the first to provide extended descriptions of
someone’s sex-gender consciousness that were based on diagnostic techniques bor-
rowed from sexology.62 This approach involved a very detailed way of asking ques-
tions about someone’s life history, capacities, and inclinations in relation to sex
and sexuality. Most other case histories with a clear interest in sex-gender con-
sciousness were not undertaken with such an elaborate psychological diagnostic
technique. 
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Conclusion
In summary, at the beginning of the twentieth century there was an important
change in the physician’s opinion of the importance of a hermaphrodite’s sex-gender
consciousness. Thus the field was claimed as a domain for medical competence.
The techniques used to make sex-gender consciousness into an object of medical
and psychological investigation were, however, not yet fully implemented.
The idea of a gonadal “true sex” that had to be congruent with someone’s
sexual desires and sex-gender position in society dominated medical thinking
about hermaphroditism from the last quarter of the nineteenth century on. In prac-
tice, however, doctors were not always certain of the gonadal sex and therefore
could not force patients to take a sex-gender position consistent with their gonadal
sex. Moreover, in a rapidly increasing number of cases, hermaphroditism was dis-
closed by surgery without anybody’s having doubted these patients’ sex before.
These may have been the reasons that doctors started to redefine the problem as
one of visible sexual ambiguity. Some doctors were more concerned with offering
their patients the option of representing a single sex than with determining their
true sex. This objective often better addressed the problem the patient desperately
wanted solved. Finally, doctors’ surgical techniques for hiding the physical ambi-
guity of a hermaphrodite improved. As a result, doctors occasionally became
responsible for the sex assignment of their patients through their decisions con-
cerning sex surgery.
These occasions intensified the medical debate on hermaphrodite sex assign-
ment. Performing surgery according to the patient’s wishes was strongly criticized,
because it appeared to make the doctor the patient’s tool. But there is ample evi-
dence that medical professionals were increasingly interested at the end of the
nineteenth century in sex-gender consciousness as a crucial component in their
determination of a hermaphrodite’s sex.
This does not necessarily mean that all physicians thought that this com-
ponent ought to be decisive or that it even mattered for the final sex assignment.
But even when physicians refused to acknowledge the importance of sex-gender
consciousness, they claimed to be capable of professionally debating the subject.
In other words, instead of offering the hermaphrodite the right to choose his or her
own sex, they started to turn sex-gender consciousness into an object of medical
investigation, into a measurable identity whose importance in relation to the final
decision only they could define. The diagnostic techniques developed in psychia-
try and sexology had not yet been fully put to use, but already they provided doc-
tors with new explanations and categorizations. By discussing the subject profes-
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sionally, doctors started to claim exclusive professional competence to balance
their judgment of someone’s sex-gender consciousness against their judgment of
the patient’s gonadal sex.
Obviously, some doctors began to be persuaded that sex-gender and sexual
consciousness were central and stable features of the self and that they were at
least factors for serious consideration when someone’s sex assignment was in ques-
tion. Even Von Neugebauer, who for at least ten years and in countless publica-
tions favored gonadal tissue as the definitive sign of one’s “true sex,” became per-
suaded that “to the hermaphrodite his own sex consciousness should be
normative.”63 I hope to have shown, however, that this statement is fundamentally
and structurally different from the recognition that a hermaphrodite had the
unmediated right to choose his or her own sex. Von Neugebauer’s change of opin-
ion concerns a shift from the right to speak from the self to a right to speak about
the self. Any history claiming to analyze critically the origination of gender as a
category of the self must take this crucial shift into account.
Notes
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1. Throughout this article I use the terms hermaphroditism and hermaphrodite to refer,
respectively, to “doubtful sex” and “someone whose sex is doubted.” To stay closer to
the terminology of my sources, I do not use the modern term intersex. I do not, how-
ever, adopt the terms pseudohermaphroditism or pseudohermaphrodite from the
sources unless I am quoting or describing them, in order to avoid the suggestion that I
could—or would want to—define a “true sex.”
2. “1. würden Sie der Person Aufklärungen über ihren eigentlichen Zustand geben? 2.
würden Sie ihr den Verkehr mit Männern untersagen und 3. würden Sie ihr das
Heiraten absolut verbieten?” (Franz Ludwig Von Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus
beim Menschen [Leipzig: Klinkhardt, 1908], 607). My source for the material on the
case of Emma R. is the supplement to Von Neugebauer’s book. The translations in this
article are my own.
3. “Der Arzt handle im gegebenen Falle, wo bei der betreffenden Person ausgesprochen
weibliches Geschlechtsbewußtsein vorliegt, humaner, die Person nicht über die statt
gehabte Erreur de sexe aufzuklären. Für den Zwitter sei sein eigenes Geschlechtsbe-
wußtsein maßgebend und wichtiger, als der anatomischen Charakter seiner Gesch-
lechtsdrüsen. Auch stehe nach dem alten preußischen Landrechte dem majorennen
Zwitter die Wahl frei, zu welchem Geschlecht er gerechnet sein will. Gerade diese
88 GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
Beobachtung Königs zeigt zur Evidenz die schwache Seite der betreffenden Para-
graphen im neuen deutschen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche” (Von Neugebauer, Hermaph-
roditismus, 607; italics added). I have translated the German word Geschlechts-
bewußtsein as sex-gender consciousness. The translation of Geschlecht is complicated.
First, Geschlecht refers to one’s physical sex and, in this sense, can be compared to the
English word sex. As Bernice L. Hausman explains, the English word sex became
restricted to physical sex only after the concept of gender (identity) had been intro-
duced to indicate social and psychological sex (Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Tech-
nology, and the Idea of Gender [Durham: Duke University Press, 1995], 75). Second,
German makes a clear distinction between Geschlecht and Sex—the latter means the
sexual act—whereas the English words sex and sexual can refer to both. Therefore
sexual consciousness could be confusing, for it can refer both to sexual preference and
to sex-gender consciousness. So to maintain the original sense, I use the term sex-
gender consciousness.
4. J. Riddle Goffe, “A Pseudohermaphrodite, in Which the Female Characteristics Pre-
dominated: Operation for Removal of the Penis and the Utilization of the Skin Cover-
ing It for the Formation of a Vaginal Canal,” American Journal of Obstetrics 48 (1903):
755–63.
5. Fred J. Taussig, “Shall a Pseudo-hermaphrodite Be Allowed to Decide to Which Sex
He or She Shall Belong?” American Journal of Obstetrics 49 (1904): 162–65; Taussig,
“Editorial Comment,” Interstate Medical Journal 11 (1904): 134; J. Riddle Goffe,
“Hermaphroditism and the True Determination of Sex,” Interstate Medical Journal 11
(1904): 314–15; Fred J. Taussig, “Rejoinder to Dr. Goffe’s Letter,” Interstate Medical
Journal 11 (1904): 316–17.
6. Franz Ludwig Von Neugebauer, “Letter to the Editor,” Interstate Medical Journal 11
(1904): 317–18.
7. See Myriam Spörri, “Die Diagnose des Geschlechts: Hermaphroditismus im sexual-
wissenschaftlichen Diskurs zwischen 1886 und 1920” (Lizentiatsarbeit, Universität
Zürich, 2000), 48–53; Ulrike Klöppel, “XXOXY Ungelöst: Störungsszenarien in der
Dramaturgie der zweigeschlechtlichen Ordnung,” in (K)ein Geschlecht oder viele?
Transgender in politischer Perspektive, ed. Jannik Franzen, Ulrike Klöppel, Bettina
Schmidt, et al. (Berlin: Querverlag, 2002), 153– 81; and Ulrike Klöppel, “ ‘Störfall’
Hermaphroditismus und Trans-Formationen der Kategorie ‘Geschlecht’: Überlegungen
zur Analyse der medizinischen Diskussionen über Hermaphroditismus um 1900 mit
Deleuze, Guattari und Foucault,” in Transformationen. Wissen-Mensch-Geschlecht.
Potsdamer Studien zur Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung 6 (2002): 137–50. Klöp-
pel’s interpretation of Neugebauer’s position differs from mine in that she concentrates
on his theoretical position and describes his interest in psychosexual matters in rela-
tion to the gonads as a constant, although she also refers to his position in these mat-
ters as “divided” (Spagat) (“ ‘Störfall,’” 148).
THE HERMAPHRODITE’S “SELF” IN MEDICAL DISCOURSE 89
8. Von Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus, 401.
9. Von Neugebauer, “Hermaphroditismus und Pseudohermaphroditismus,” in Handbuch
der ärztlichen sachverständigen Tätigkeit, ed. Paul Dittrich, vol. 5, pt. 1, no. 3
(Vienna: Braumüller, 1916), 255–95, esp. 292–93.
10. A. Geijl, “Over operatief ingrijpen bij pseudohermaphroditismus masculinus of femi-
ninus externus,” Medisch Weekblad van Noord-en Zuid-Nederland 9 (1904): 281–84,
326 –30, 381– 88, 397–404, 413–20, 433–35, 464–71, 494–501, 512–19,
555–58, 567–70, 586–91, 632–39. For Von Neugebauer’s defense see his “Letter to
the Editor,” 318.
11. “De gesteldheid der geslachtsklieren heeft ter bepaling van het geslacht van den her-
mafrodiet en voor ons praktisch optreden tegenover den drager, minder waarde dan de
toestand der copulatieorganen en den aard van het gemoeds-en zieleleven der
betrokken persoon” (Geijl, “Over operatief,” 590).
12. “In neuester Zeit sind über diese Frage heftige Kontroversen ausgebrochen, und ich
musste mir persönlich einen sehr scharfen Angriff von Dr. Geijl in Holland gefallen
lassen, der mich beschuldigte, einem Mädchen, das ich als verkannter männlichen
Scheinzwitter erkannte, widerrechtlich geraten zu haben, die weibliche Metrik in eine
männliche zu ändern” (Von Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus, 62).
13. Franz Ludwig Von Neugebauer, “Mann oder Weib? Sechs eigene Beobachtungen von
Scheinzwittertum und ‘Erreur de Sexe,’” Zentralblatt für Gynäkologie 2 (1904):
33–51; Theodor Landau, “Mann oder Weib?” Zentralblatt für Gynäkologie 7 (1904):
203–4. See also Landau, “Über Hermaphroditen: Nebst einigen Bemerkungen über
die Erkenntnis und die rechtliche Stellung dieser Individuen,” Berliner klinische
Wochenschrift 15 (1903): 339–43.
14. M. R. Blondel, “Observation de pseudohermaphrodisme,” Bulletins et mémoires de la
Société obstétricale et gynécologique de Paris, 1899, 3–12; Xavier Delore, “Des étapes
de l’hermaphrodisme,” L’écho médicale de Lyon 4 (1899): 193–205, 225 –32; see
esp. 229. See also Alice Domurat Dreger, Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention
of Sex (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 125–26.
15. For the quotation see Taussig, “Shall a Pseudo-hermaphrodite?” 162.
16. Dreger, Hermaphrodites, 139–66.
17. Alice Domurat Dreger, “From the Age of Gonads to the Age of Consent,” in Intersex in
the Age of Ethics, ed. Alice Domurat Dreger (Hagerstown, MD: University Publishing
Group, 1999), 9.
18. Dreger, Hermaphrodites, 130–31.
19. From Von Neugebauer’s huge bibliography I have collected 251 cases of hermaphro-
ditism in living adults (ages twelve and up) between 1790 and 1908. They include
cases described in German, French, Dutch, and English. In approximately half of
these cases I have found the original sources on which Von Neugebauer based his
analyses. The database is unfinished; English cases in particular are still lacking.
90 GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
Other analyses of the available data and sources, on which I am preparing publica-
tions, also reveal that Dreger’s “age of gonads” was far more complex than she sug-
gests. See Geertje Mak, “Das vergeschlechtlichte Selbst als Nebenprodukt der medi-
zinischen Geschlechter-Konstruktion: Hermaphroditen in klinischen Begegnungen im
19. Jahrhundert,” Invertito 6 (2004): 95–109.
20. Hausman, Changing Sex, 78–79.
21. Robert Stoller introduced the term core gender identity about a decade later (Haus-
man, Changing Sex, 104).
22. Both Dreger (Hermaphrodites, 86, 92–93, 149 –50) and Myriam Spörri (“N.O.Body,
Magnus Hirschfeld und die Diagnose des Geschlechts: Hermaphroditismus um 1900,”
L’homme Z.F.G. 14 [2003]: 249–50) wrongly claim that until 1910 diagnostic surgery
was impossible without unsexing the hermaphrodite. Taussig (“Rejoinder,” 316) refers
to five diagnostic laparotomies mentioned by Von Neugebauer (“What Value Has the
Knowledge of Pseudo-hermaphroditism for the Practitioner?” Interstate Medical Jour-
nal 11 [1904]: 118 –19). For a description of two diagnostic operations see Von
Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus, 429–33.
23. My narratological approach to medical case histories and texts is mainly inspired by
Mieke Bal, De theorie van vertellen en verhalen: Inleiding in de narratologie, 5th ed.
(Muiderberg: Coutinho, 1990). For another narratological approach to medical case
histories see Julia Epstein, Altered Conditions: Disease, Medicine, and Storytelling
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 23–76.
24. Goffe, “Pseudohermaphrodite,” 755, 757.
25. Goffe does not literally quote the family doctor, but the shift in tenses makes it clear
where the paraphrase stops.
26. The case histories of pseudohermaphrodites closely resemble those of “sexual inverts”
in structure. See Geertje Mak, Mannelijke vrouwen: Over grenzen van sekse in de
negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam: Boom, 1997), 174–77, 207–8.
27. Goffe, “Pseudohermaphrodite,” 758–59.
28. Hausman, Changing Sex, 79.
29. Taussig, “Shall a Pseudo-hermaphrodite?” 163–64.
30. Taussig, “Editorial Comment,” 134.
31. Goffe, “True Determination,” 314–15.
32. Taussig, “Rejoinder,” 316. Taussig is referring to Theodor Landau’s article “Mann oder
Weib?” The Berendes-Landau case, incidentally, involved a different person, Leopold
Landau.
33. Von Neugebauer, “Letter to the Editor,” 317.
34. The paragraphs concerning hermaphrodites in Das preußische Landrecht are found in
section 1, part 1: §19, “Wenn Zwitter geboren werden, so bestimmen die Eltern, zu
welchem Geschlecht sie erzogen werden sollen” (If children are born hermaphroditic,
the parents decide which sex they shall be raised as); §20, “Jedoch steht einem
THE HERMAPHRODITE’S “SELF” IN MEDICAL DISCOURSE 91
solchen Menschen nach zurückgelegtem 18. Jahre die Wahl frei, zu welchem Gesch-
lecht er sich halten will” (However, at the age of eighteen such a person is free to
choose to which sex he wants to belong); §21, “Nach dieser Wahl werden seine Rechte
künftig bestimmt” (This choice determines his future rights); §22, “Sind aber die
Rechte eines Dritten von dem Geschlecht eines vermeintlichen Zwitters abhängig, so
kann ersterer auf eine Untersuchung durch Sachverständige antragen” (However, if the
rights of a third party are dependent on the sex of a putative hermaphrodite, that party
may petition to have this person examined by experts); and §23, “Der Befund der
Sachverständige entscheidet auch gegen die Wahl des Zwitters und seiner Eltern”
(The findings of the experts supersede the choice of the hermaphrodite and his par-
ents).
35. Dreger, Hermaphrodites, 145–50.
36. Ibid., 110–14.
37. Von Neugebauer, “Letter to the Editor,” 318. For another discussion of Geijl’s attack
see Von Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus, 62.
38. Von Neugebauer, “What Value?” 120.
39. “Eine Änderung der Metrik könne nur dann stattfinden, wenn die betreffende Person
selbst eine solche Änderung verlange, zwingen aber könne man sie dazu nicht” (Von
Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus, 401).
40. “Devant le chirurgien, plus encore que devant tout autre, le sujet doit demeurer libre
de prendre telle détermination qu’il juge à propos et il doit demeurer certain de la dis-
crétion” (Guermonprez, “Une erreur de sexe avec ses conséquences,” Annales d’hy-
giène publique et de médecine légale, September–October 1892, 304).
41. The only exception was when a case was brought to court, for instance, a request for
marriage nullification. When someone else’s interests were involved, medical experts
defined the outcome. Cf. n. 34.
42. Hausman, Changing Sex, 7.
43. Epstein, Altered Conditions, 122.
44. See N. D. Jewson, “The Disappearance of the Sick-Man from Medical Cosmology,
1770–1870,” Sociology 8 (1974): 369 – 85; and W. F. Bynum, Science and the Prac-
tice of Medicine in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 1–23.
45. G. R. Green, “Hypospadias,” Quarterly Medical Journal 1 (1898): 169, cited in Von
Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus, 214. The case is also mentioned by Dreger, and the
“solution” seems consistent with what she describes as the English way of dealing
with discrepancies between gonadal and lived sex, but she does not focus on the ques-
tion of who actually arrived at this solution (Hermaphrodites, 122–23, 126). Green’s
case was severely criticized only thirteen years later by two French doctors (Th. Tuffier
and A. Lapointe, “L’hermaphrodisme: Ses variétés et ses conséquences pour la pra-
tique médicale [d’après un cas personnel],” Revue de gynécologie et de chirurgie
abdominale 17 [1911]: 209–68, esp. 266).
92 GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
46. See the exchanges between Blondel and Delore and between Landau and Von Neuge-
bauer above, as well as the one among Green, Tuffier, and Lapointe in n. 43.
47. From 1920 on, growing doubts about the possibility of reaching a medical definition of
“true sex” undermined doctors’ claims to authority in sex assignment matters, and
consequently many patients had a say in what happened (Hausman, Changing Sex,
72–109).
48. Hausman, who claims that the concept of gender did the trick, sets out to explore “the
extent to which the commonsense understanding of transsexualism as a ‘disorder of
gender identity’ is a cover-up for the potentially more threatening idea that transsexu-
als are subjects who choose to engineer themselves” (ibid., 9).
49. Taussig, “Shall a Pseudo-hermaphrodite?” 162.
50. It is not always clear whether the terms used in the English sources, psycho-sexual
feelings, psychic sex, and psychic sexuality, refer to sex-gender or sexual preferences or
both. This confusion is another indication that those concepts were hardly distin-
guished at the time.
51. Goffe is wrong about this. See n. 22.
52. William Lee Howard, “Sex Perversion in America,” American Journal of Dermatology
and Genito-Urinary Diseases, January 1904, quoted in Goffe, “True Determination,”
314–15.
53. Taussig, “Rejoinder,” 316, 317.
54. Mak, “Das vergeschlechtlichte Selbst.”
55. “XX. Männlicher Scheinzwitter als Mädchen erzogen, erkennt spontan sein
männliches Geschlecht”; “XXI. Änderung der Metrik trotz festgestellten Erreur de
sexe von dem Scheinzwitter verweigert”; “LXXVII. Geschlechtsbewußtsein und
Geschlechts drang; 1. Geschlechtsbewußtsein dem anatomischen Charakter der
Geschlechtsdrüsen nicht entsprechend” (Von Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus,
673–75, 698 –702). Klöppel claims that Von Neugebauer was the man who opened
the field of hermaphroditism to scientific research into the relation between the “psy-
cho-sexual center” (a concept of Krafft-Ebing) and physical or gonadal sex (see
“‘Störfall’”; and “XXOXY Ungelöst”).
56. See George Chauncey, “From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the
Changing Conceptualization of Female Deviance,” Salmagundi, nos. 58 –59 (1982–
83): 114–46; Gert Hekma, “ ‘A Female Soul in a Male Body’: Sexual Inversion as
Gender Inversion in Nineteenth-Century Sexology,” in Third Sex, Third Gender:
Beyond Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History, ed. Gilbert Herdt (New York:
Zone, 1994), 213–40; Klaus Müller, Aber in meinem Herzen sprach eine Stimme so
laut: Homosexuelle Autobiographien und medizinische Pathographien im neunzehnten
Jahrhundert (Berlin: Winkel, 1991); and Harry Oosterhuis, Stepchildren of Nature:
Krafft-Ebing, Psychiatry, and the Making of Sexual Identity (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000).
THE HERMAPHRODITE’S “SELF” IN MEDICAL DISCOURSE 93
57. For a detailed analysis about the confusion of sex and sexuality in a case of sexual
inversion in a woman see Mak, Mannelijke vrouwen, 225–34; and Geertje Mak, “San-
dor/Sarolta Vay: From Passing Woman to Sexual Invert,” Journal of Women’s History 16
(2004): 53–76.
58. Magnus Hirschfeld, Die Transvestiten: Eine Untersuchung über den erotischen Verklei-
dungstrieb, mit umfangreichen casuïstischen und historischen Material (Berlin: Medi-
zin, 1910); Havelock Ellis, Eonism and Other Supplementary Studies, vol. 7 of Stud-
ies in the Psychology of Sex (Philadelphia: Davies, 1928).
59. Oosterhuis, Stepchildren of Nature, 248. For Oosterhuis’s analysis of the development
of an “authentic (homo)sexual self” see 215–30.
60. Dreger, Hermaphrodites, 126–30.
61. Von Neugebauer, “What Value?” 124. 
62. Magnus Hirschfeld, Geschlechtsumwandlungen: Irrtümer in der Geschlechtsbestim-
mung; Sechs Fälle aus dem forensischen Praxis (Berlin: Adler, 1912). For an analysis
see Mak, Mannelijke Vrouwen, 334–39; and Magnus Hirschfeld, “Drei Fälle von
irrtümlicher Geschlechtsbestimmung,” Medizinische Reform: Wochenschrift für soziale
Medizin 14, no. 51 (1906): 614–17.
63. Von Neugebauer, Hermaphroditismus, 607.
94 GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
